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ABSTRACT: A great deal of attention has been paid to the consequences of economic inequality on politi-
cal participation, yet only few empirical studies address the macro-micro relationship between income in-
equality and individual engagement. Furthermore, empirical indications diverge and give rise to competing 
theoretical arguments to be tested. This article seeks to fill this gap and to do so by using the latest round 
of the European Social Survey (ESS). The contribution is twofold: on the one hand, it establishes a direct 
link between measures of economic and political inequality - albeit of a particular type. On the other, it 
provides an up-to-date picture on participatory trends in Europe. In more details, income inequality is 
found to depress overall political participation and, most importantly, to increase the participatory gap 
between rich and poor for all unconventional forms of engagement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Analyses on economic inequality and political participation abound in the politico-
sociological literature, all the more so given the ongoing rise of economic inequality in 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(1) 2016: 72-100, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p72 
 
73 
 
Western democracies and beyond (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Atkinson 2008; 
OECD 2014). A great deal of studies, for instance, demonstrate that individual-level re-
sources significantly shape the likelihood of political engagement - then implying that 
their uneven distribution translates in unequal contribution to the decision-making 
process, thus contributing to the violation of the democratic ideal of political equality - 
albeit of a particular type. Relatively less attention is traditionally placed on the macro-
micro linkage between contextual factors and citizen participation, i.e. on the effect of 
macro-level variables on micro-level behaviors. Being economic inequality the focus of 
this article, it is analytically useful to distinguish between two main questions that 
should be addressed (Duch and Sagarzazu 2014): does economic inequality significantly 
affect political participation, that is everyone's likelihood to engage in politics (direct 
impact)? And, by doing so, does it modify the participatory gap caused by individual re-
sources (contingent impact)?  
The issue is surely relevant, both in general terms and in particular for this journal, 
given its focus on dynamics of conflict and participation. Indeed, inequality is classically 
supposed to increase political polarization (e.g. Pontusson and Rueda 2008, Rehm 
2011) and, by implication, the level of political engagement. These expectations are, 
however, contradicted by empirical evidences (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2015), and the 
opposite tendency is documented by Solt (2008, 2010, 2015) who authored one among 
the most systematic series of studies on this topic.   
Among other noteworthy studies, Solt's stands out thanks to its systematic attention 
on the macro-micro impact of inequality on individual participation. On the one hand, 
it demonstrates that income inequality systematically depresses political engagement. 
On the other, his Multilevel Models show that inequality has the strongest, depressing 
effect among the poorest, thus contributing to enlarge the participatory gap between 
the better- and the worse-off. Building on Schattschneider's original hypothesis (1960), 
Solt elaborates a theoretical account of this tendency, i.e. the so-called "relative power 
theory".  
Despite this important contribution, there is still place for further studies. First and 
foremost, it is necessary to test these findings on different datasets. As a matter of 
fact, Solt originally tests his theory on a very rich dataset, including data from diverse 
countries such as Europe, the United States, and Taiwan (Solt 2008, 59). The strategy is 
of course valuable, but it also entails some cons, among others the danger of the so-
called omitted variable bias. In other words, it increases the likelihood of the presence 
of third variables that the researcher is not able to control for, and that possibly make 
the relationship between inequality and participation spurious.  
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Secondly, empirical results do not always back Solt's findings and his theoretical 
elaborations. As an example, Anderson and Beramendi (2008) confirm the direct, de-
pressing effect of inequality in 18 OECD countries. Nevertheless, they also conclude 
that overall income inequality affects people at different ends of the income distribu-
tion similarly, thus having no effect on the participatory gap between the rich and the 
poor.  
Thirdly, an alternative and well-established theoretical tradition - i.e. the so-called 
conflict theory - contradicts the aforementioned predictions and is worth being tested 
here. As previously mentioned, inequality is commonly associated to increased polari-
zation, hence higher conflictuality. By replicating and testing Solt's findings, it is note-
worthy to keep in mind the alternative theoretical perspective.  
Fourthly, and lastly, Solt's studies employ earlier data, almost exclusively covering a 
period of time prior to the onset of the current economic crisis. It is thus noteworthy to 
replicate the analysis in a later stage of the ongoing economic turmoil, in order to eval-
uate whether previous predictions are confirmed or not. The article aims at doing so, 
by focusing on European countries only and exploiting data from the 2012 round of the 
European Social Survey.  
The article is structured as follows: in the next section, previous analyses are pre-
sented in more details, together with the working hypotheses hinging on them. Data 
and methods are introduced in the third section, while the empirical analysis is devel-
oped in the fourth one. The main findings are subsequently discussed and interpreted 
in the light of the broader literature.  
 
 
2. The state of the field 
 
The fact that not everyone takes part in democratic politics is a well-established fact 
in the literature, highlighted by Lijphart's APSA Presidential Address as "democracy's 
unresolved dilemma" (Lijphart 1997). A number of studies show that political participa-
tion is unevenly distributed across social groups, irrespective of the indicator under 
analysis, i.e. income (Lane 1959; Anderson and Beramendi 2008; Solt 2008), education 
(Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Marien et al. 2010; Armingeon and Schädel 2015), family 
background (Verba, Burns and Schlozman 2003), and so forth. Given my interest for in-
come at the micro-level, and for income inequality at the macro-level, the first aim of 
the article is to test whether, and to what extent, differences in income translate in dif-
ferent propensities to engage politically. Unsurprisingly, the first hypothesis is that:  
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H1) High-income earners are more likely to be politically active than low-income 
earners.   
 
The design gets more complicated when it comes to the macro-micro effect of eco-
nomic inequality on political participation. As suggested by Duch and Sagarzazu (2014) 
- and as mentioned in the introduction - , two distinct effects should be taken into ac-
count when addressing the effects of macro-economic variables on individual behav-
iors, i.e. the direct impact of inequality on participation, and the contingent impact, 
depending on individual characteristics.  
For what pertains the former, two well-established schools of thought are worth be-
ing mentioned. The so-called conflict theory maintains that individuals engage in poli-
tics as soon as they have interest to do so. As economic self-interest is one among the 
strongest motivations for human action, inequality is expected to affect individual pro-
pensity to engage. On the one hand, higher inequality fuels differences in popular pref-
erences about the proper policy to be adopted, either to demand state intervention in 
the economy, or to leave the economic sphere essentially unregulated (Meltzer and 
Richards 1981; Finseraas 2008). On the other, this is expected to activate both the 
worse- and the better-off, who are motivated to demand and oppose redistributive 
policies respectively. In a nutshell, the resulting working hypothesis maintains that:  
 
H2a) Economic inequality increases political participation.  
 
Needless to say, empirical results rarely corroborate such expectation. Macro-level 
data show that economic inequality is on the rise virtually everywhere, whereas polari-
zation is not (Iversen and Soskice 2015). Furthermore, participation in Western Europe 
has declined steadily: rather than being motivated to defend politically their interest, 
citizens apparently refrain from political actions, be it in form of party membership 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) or in terms of voter turnout (Blais 2007).  
A possible explanation is elaborated by Solt (2008, 2010), who builds on 
Schattschneider's original hypothesis predicting the association between high rates of 
economic inequality and lower - and more biased - electoral turnout. The point of de-
parture is the assumption that money and personal affluence can be used to influence 
others and to steer political decisions. The more concentrated wealth and income, the 
more concentrated its power, with better-off turning out to be even richer (hence, 
more powerful) in comparison to poor. On this basis, well-off in unequal countries are 
expected to more easily prevail in occasionally open conflicts on issues of their interest 
(Goodin and Dryzek 1980, 286), or even to prevent some issues to become part of the 
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agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 6-11; Schattschneider 1960, 106). Should the poor 
perceive the political system to be unable to develop any alternative narrative in their 
interest, they can rationally decide to give up engagement in politics (Gaventa 1980, 9-
13; Pateman 1971, 297-98; Schattschneider 1960, 105). Conversely, this reduces also 
well-off's incentives to political mobilization, given the withdrawal of the main con-
tenders (and the possibility to steer politics by other means). In a nutshell: the relative 
power theory predicts a diametrically opposite impact of economic inequality 
(Schattschneider 1960; Ulsaner and Brown 2005, Solt 2008):  
 
H2b) Economic inequality decreases political participation.  
 
A potentially alternative explanation lies in the rise of alternative forms of engage-
ment. As Dalton puts it, "rising sophistication levels may change the nature of partici-
pation" (2008, 54); hence, declining electoral turnouts might be counterbalanced by 
the rise of alternative forms of campaigning and/or expression of political dis-
sent/support, especially in established democracies (e.g. Zuckin et al. 2006; Marien et 
al. 2010).  
In other words, it is plausible to assume that unconventional forms of participation 
may be perceived as corrective mechanisms of representative democracies' shortcom-
ings (Offe 2003; Della Porta 2011). Whereas voting is interpreted as paying lip service 
to an unjust political system that remains silent on people problems, alternative forms 
of participation could be perceived as the only way to steer or counterbalance the es-
tablishment-driven mainstream politics. The related working hypothesis thus goes as 
follows:  
 
H2c) Economic inequality depresses electoral participation, but it encourages alter-
native forms of participation. 
 
This is what concerns the direct impact of income inequality on political participa-
tion. However, "what matters is not only the amount of civic activity but its distribu-
tion, not just how many people take part but who they are" (Schlozman et al. 2005). In 
other words, it is also important to assess whether inequality has an impact which is 
contingent on individual characteristics.  
As previously mentioned (H1), the focus of this article is on individual-level economic 
resources, so does income inequality modify the participatory gap that exists between 
the rich and the poor, all other things being equal? Once again, two competing predic-
tions are worth being mentioned: on the one hand, it is classically assumed that larger 
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social distances generate the feeling that the poor are relatively poorer, and that such 
feelings of relative deprivation act as strong motivation for people to engage (Lipsky 
1968; Gurr 1970). In this light, the contextual effect of inequality should affect first and 
foremost those who are relatively impoverished1, i.e. the worse-off, by increasing their 
likelihood of political engagement. Muller and Seligson (1987), for instance, demon-
strate that high inequality increases the probability that most disaffected groups organ-
ize in collective actions. Consequently, the participatory gap between the better- and 
worse-off should decline with the increase of inequality, at least for what concerns al-
ternative forms of participation. The third working hypothesis can thus be stated as fol-
lows:  
 
H3a) Economic inequality decreases the participatory gap between rich and poor, 
since it promotes political engagement among the worse-off.  
 
Once again, this is rarely confirmed by existing empirical studies. According to the 
relative power theory presented above, the possibility of the rich to influence and steer 
politics by other means discourages political participation first and foremost among the 
worse-off. Consistently, Solt (2008, 2010, 2015) repeatedly demonstrates that the mac-
ro-micro depressing impact of income inequality is stronger for the poor than for the 
rich. The same asymmetric effect on civic engagement in post-communist countries is 
documented by Karakoç (2013), who shows that increasing inequality declines partici-
pation overall, but with a stronger effect on the poorest quintile.  
 
H3b) Economic inequality increases the participatory gap between rich and poor, 
since it promotes political engagement among the worse-off. 
 
 
3. Data, variables, and methods 
 
3.1 Data  
Whereas aforementioned studies address the macro-micro relationship between 
economic inequality and political participation well before the current economic crisis, 
this article tests the competing hypotheses during the crisis. All data are obtained from 
the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS), which has been administered in 
 
1
 Anderson and Beramendi (2012) offer a noteworthy contribution in this respect, as they highlight that 
party competition on the left creates different incentives for the mobilization of lower income voters in 
contexts characterized by different levels of inequality.  
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2012. The ESS is a biennial, high-quality survey of values, attitudes and behavior among 
Europeans and integrates the survey answers with multilevel data at the regional and 
national level; more information, including the complete list of participating countries, 
can be found at http://europeansocialsurvey.org. Replicating previous studies in the 
course of the economic crisis is particularly important, as the economic dimension of 
political competition might become a stronger motivator for political engagement in 
times of economic turmoil - thus making the difference for participatory rates.  
To be sure, all those countries that are not rated as free by Freedom House in 2012 
are excluded from the analysis, i.e. Russia, Ukraine, Albania, and Kosovo (the complete 
report is available on http://freedomhouse.org). Needless to say, comparing participa-
tion trends in free and unfree countries is misleading, since the choice not to partici-
pate has a totally different meaning. By contrast, Israel is kept in the sample as it is 
commonly rated as a full democracy by international observers. Beyond the controver-
sies about considering Israel as a European country, the focus here is on the effect of 
macro-economic conditions on individual behavior, regardless of any cultural consider-
ation. As a result, my dataset includes 25 countries and a total of 47515 individuals (ta-
ble 1 below provides with a comprehensive list of countries, as well as some descrip-
tive statistics for each). 
  
3.2 Independent variables 
In regards to the main explanatory variables at the individual level, I consider first 
and foremost the level of income. Even though some economists prefer other mone-
tary variable to evaluate the distribution of living standards in a given society (e.g. con-
sumption expenditures), income remains the prevalent focal variable used in rich coun-
tries, such as the European ones (Brandolini and Smeeding 2011). The ESS provides 
with a measure of the household's total net income, through which respondents are 
asked to place themselves in income deciles groups specific to each country.  
Strictly connected to this, the main independent variable of interest at the country 
level is income inequality, measured by the widely-used Gini coefficient after taxes and 
transfers. Values for these variables are taken from the ESS datasets and the OECD da-
tabases. As developed in more details in the previous section, my expectation is that 
income inequality has a comparable effect on each country included in the dataset. As 
amply documented in the literature, Europe is pretty cohesive in its widening economic 
inequality and the neoliberal distribution mechanisms of economic resources. As such, 
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there are no theoretical reasons to expect a different impact of income inequality 
across countries2.   
Several control variables are introduced in the models. At the country-level, controls 
are used with parsimony because of the limited number of countries (level-2 units) and 
the related statistical problems (Hox 2002; Hayes 2006). Following the relevant litera-
ture, participation is supposed to be influenced first and foremost by the institutional 
set-up and by the party-system (Blais 2007). On the one hand, the focus is on electoral 
systems: whereas proportional systems are expected to increase individuals' motiva-
tion to participate, disproportional systems tend to decrease it (Lijphart 1997; Blais and 
Aarts 2006). On the other, this might be due to the fact that proportional systems tend 
to encourage the establishment of a higher number of parties running for elections 
(Duverger 1954). The presence of more parties translates in more choice and, eventu-
ally, in higher turnout, since citizens have higher probability to find a party near their 
position3. In order to capture both sides of the coin, I include in the models the Index of 
Absolute Disproportionality, which is obtained from the Comparative Political Data 
Sets. 
In addition to this, post-communist legacy should also be controlled for. The litera-
ture shows that political participation is systematically lower in post-communist coun-
tries (Howard, 2003; Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Pacek et al, 2009). I therefore create 
a dummy variable distinguishing post-communist countries from Western European4.  
Further control variables are included at level-1. More than anything, the role of ed-
ucation in connection to political participation has been assessed at length by the liter-
ature (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963) and its importance is confirmed repeatedly (Verba 
et al. 1995; Blais 2000; Marien et al. 2010; Armingeon and Schädel 2015). Classically, 
people with a longer educational history are supposed to be more able to assess the 
importance of politics and the consequences of their participation. As a consequence, 
more years spent in the educational system are expected to have a powerful (and posi-
tive) influence on individual propensity to participate. Age is also supposed to show a 
strong impact (Blais 2000, 2007), even though its influence might be multifaceted. 
 
2
 Having said that, a pilot test has been carried out to evaluate whether differences in the impact of ine-
quality between post-communist and Western European countries are visible, but the results show no 
empirical support, statistically non significant coefficients for the interaction terms..  
3
 This relationship is however contested in the literature, as some authors find that more parties tend to 
depress turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Fornos et al. 2004).  
4
 Another macro-level factor that is often controlled for is the level of economic wellbeing. Besides the 
methodological problems associated to adding a new level-2 variable in the present study, I do not include 
it, because studies show that economic wellbeing affects the difference between rich (and somewhat rich) 
countries and poor ones, while it does not hold in analyses focused on Western democracies (Blais 2007). 
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Whereas younger generations are generally found to be less interested in recognized 
political engagement, recent studies suggest that they tend to vote less, but participate 
more through alternative channels, e.g. protest actions (Melo and Stockemer 2014). 
Similarly, existing research finds marked differences between males and females in in-
tended political participation (Hooghe and Stolle 2004). In this light, a dummy for gen-
der (1 = female) is included in all models. Unsurprisingly, membership in a union is 
supposed to increase the likelihood of people to engage (Radcliff and Davis 2000), 
while being born in another country most probably depresses interest and engagement 
in the political process of the destination country. Last but not least, individual religiosi-
ty may have some kind of impact as well (Blais 2000), although no agreement over its 
effect exists in the literature, both because religiosity entails diverse dimensions that 
shape political attitudes differently (Bloom and Arikan 2012) and because different po-
litical behaviors are not equally affected by religiosity (Filetti 2014). 
 
3.3 Dependent variables 
As previously argued, there are all reasons to take into consideration all actions un-
dertaken by ordinary citizens to influence politics, thus assessing the effects of income 
inequality on different forms of political participation. The European Social Survey al-
lows to do so, since it provides with a relatively vast range of engagement. Table 1 re-
ports some descriptive statistics at the aggregate level for each form of participation. 
As it is clear, strong differences exist both between countries and between forms of 
participation. Voting is evidently the most diffused form of participation in Europe. 
With an average of 71.9% of voters at the latest national elections, Europe is below the 
global average of 75.5% provided by Blais (2007, 622-623) and this holds true also if 
one excludes the post-communist countries (73.1%). Among the alternative forms of 
participation, only three surpass the threshold of 15% of the active population: working 
in organizations, signing petitions and boycotting products. The first two - working in 
organizations and petitioning -  have a clear political connotation and are both included 
among the conventional and non-electoral activities in Brady's classification system for 
political activities (2004). Boycotting products is also politically relevant, even if it does 
not necessarily imply a direct interaction with the political sphere as in the other cases. 
Most of the literature includes boycotts among the bottom-up actions aiming at coerc-
ing corporate and policy change, even if indirectly (e.g. Brady 2004; a more extensive 
discussion on boycott and consumerism as political behavior can be found in Stolle et 
al. 2005). In addition to electoral participation, I thus focus on these three, most dif-
fused, forms of participation.  
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Table 1 - Participation in European countries (aggregate %) 
Countries Vot-
ed 
Contact-
ed politi-
cians 
Worke
d party 
Worke
d or-
ganiz. 
Worn 
badg
e 
Signed 
peti-
tion 
Public 
demonst
. 
Boycott 
prod-
uct 
Belgium 78.5 16.1 4.4 18.4 6.5 20.6 5.2 11.3 
Bulgaria 72.9 4.8 3.0 1.3 2.6 7.8 5.8 3.7 
Switzerland 55.5 14.8 6.4 17.4 5.6 34.1 4.4 28.2 
Cyprus 73.8 15.4 4.9 7.3 4.8 10.7 4.5 10.2 
Czech Rep. 58.2 12.1 1.6 5.9 7.5 18.9 6.9 13.7 
Germany 72.9 15.9 4.8 32.7 6.2 34.9 9.1 35.8 
Denmark 85.3 16.6 3.9 25.0 6.3 25.0 4.3 25.7 
Estonia 59.3 12.3 2.3 4.8 3.7 9.6 4.0 6.5 
Spain 72.3 13.3 7.9 22.1 10.8 33.2 25.9 17.4 
Finland 79.0 18.4 3.1 37.2 16.8 23.7 1.5 34.9 
France 70.1 11.1 3.1 12.4 6.9 28.8 11.7 31.7 
United 
Kingdom 
66.3 15.2 1.9 7.7 6.0 32.1 3.1 18.5 
Hungary 67.3 4.9 1.1 3.3 1.2 3.0 3.6 3.7 
Ireland 68.3 18.4 3.4 12.3 7.5 23.6 11.5 11.2 
Israel 69.8 10.7 22.3 3.9 3.5 13.4 11.0 22.0 
Iceland 77.8 26.3 10.4 40.1 43.8 56.4 17.4 32.7 
Italy 78.3 15.5 5.4 12.6 10.9 23.2 17.3 12.0 
Lithuania 51.6 7.3 3.8 2.8 3.0 6.0 2.1 1.9 
Nether-
lands 
79.9 14.3 3.5 25.7 3.8 22.1 2.8 12.1 
Norway 75.3 21.8 7.9 32.1 29.7 35.4 9.6 24.0 
Poland 64.5 7.3 2.5 7.1 4.4 10.4 2.3 5.7 
Portugal 64.0 6.2 1.4 4.2 1.9 7.5 6.9 2.9 
Sweden 82.1 16.3 4.4 34.3 20.0 43.6 7.3 42.8 
Slovenia 59.7 7.2 2.6 1.9 1.4 7.7 3.4 3.9 
Slovakia 74.1 8.3 1.7 4.1 3.0 20.1 4.1 10.4 
Total 71.9 13.2 4.0 16.5 7.4 26.3 9.9 20.6 
  
 
3.4 Method 
A two-step strategy is adopted to investigate the relationship between macro-
economic inequality and political participation. As a first step, the analysis is at the ag-
gregate level: a measure of political inequality between better- and worse-off is com-
puted in the next section and, subsequently, the connection between this country-level 
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index and the measure of economic inequality is assessed. This is useful to gain a gen-
eral picture of the relationship between political and economic inequalities.  
As a second step, the findings are tested at the individual-level. The focus thus shifts 
to the macro-micro relationship between income inequality and individual participa-
tion in politics. The study thus involves variables at more levels of analysis and data 
cannot be investigated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, since this 
would entail some methodological problems. First, OLS models are unable to disentan-
gle the contribution of the hierarchical levels: units belonging to the same cluster share 
unobserved common factors so that their outcomes are positively correlated. Second, 
they perform inaccurate inferences on the statistical significance of level-2 variables - 
since it is calculated on the larger number of level-1 units, the significance tests reject 
the null hypothesis more often than if calculated at the appropriate level (Hox 2002; or 
Snijders and Bosker, 1999).  
Multilevel Regression Models (MRM) are used instead. Contrary to OLS, MRM are 
best suited because they are both able to take into account the hierarchical structure 
of the dataset, and to estimate level-1 and level-2 coefficients at their own level of 
analysis. More precisely, Multilevel Regression Models with Random Intercept are 
specified, which basically means that the average level of response (i.e. active popula-
tion) is expected to vary randomly across countries. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis  
 
4.1 Income Inequality and Participation at the Aggregate Level 
As Dubrow nicely summarizes, focusing on participatory patterns allows to approach 
the issue of political (in)equality from a specific angle. Needless to say, major concerns 
are associated with measuring empirically political inequality: being the concept so 
complex and open to different interpretations, several approaches can be adopted to 
measure it. Among others5, one strategy is to pay attention to the efforts that individu-
als and groups make (or do not make) to achieve political decisions favorable to them 
(Dubrow 2014, 21). In other words, studying trends of political participation and con-
 
5
 Dubrow (2014) distinguishes between two broad strategies: voice and response. Whether this article 
posits itself in the former field, the alternative perspective highlights whether and to what extent the polit-
ical system is differently responsive to citizens demands. Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2012), for instance, 
famously demonstrate that the interest of the worse-off is systematically underrepresented by US public 
policies. However, as Dubrow himself concedes, not a single study can be characterized as truly compre-
hensive, and one should be clear to address a specific feature of political inequality.  
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necting them to economic predictors sheds light on the link between economic and po-
litical inequality - albeit of a particular type.  
The first empirical goal is thus to elaborate a synthetic measure of inequality of polit-
ical participation. To this end, the active population among the two poorest and the 
two richest quintiles in each European country is taken into consideration, in order to 
calculate the odds ratio (OR) of participation. The OR is a relative measure of effect 
that permits to quantify how strongly the presence or absence of a given characteristic 
shapes the observed phenomenon - i.e. how strongly the fact of belonging to the low-
est/richest part of the population shapes the probability to be politically active.  
Percentages of active population in the poorest and richest quintiles, as well as the 
computed OR for each country are reported in Appendix A.  As it is clear, the closer the 
OR to 1, the more equal the participation of better- and worse-off; the lower this 
measure, the more unequal it becomes. As an example, the likelihood of poor people 
to vote in Belgium - as compared to the likelihood among the rich - is to be multiplied 
by .539, i.e. it is roughly halved by the fact of "being poor". Obviously, clear differences 
across countries as well across types of participation exist. Whereas voting seems to be 
afflicted by a relatively larger gap in countries such as Germany, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands, alternative forms are more discriminatory in others, e.g. Portugal and Ice-
land.  
In order to have a clearer picture, it is meaningful to associate it to the selected 
measure of income inequality. The relationship between income inequality and the OR 
for each form of participation is graphically represented in the charts below. 
Two points are worthy of mention. On the one hand, income inequality seems to be 
positively associated with the computed measure of political inequality. As a general 
tendency, the higher the Gini coefficient, the lower the Odds Ratio that calculates the 
relative probability of poor, as compared to the rich, to be politically active. On the 
other hand, this association is particularly strong for alternative forms of participation: 
whereas in the case of voting, the slope of the regression line approximates 0 (i.e. the 
line is practically flat) and the R2 indicates a very low fit, things change in the case of 
boycotting products, working in organizations, and signing petitions. In all three cases, 
the OR evidently decreases - indicating a wider gap between the likelihoods of partici-
pation of better- and worse-off - alongside the increase of the Gini coefficient. Addi-
tionally, the R2 indicates a fairly good fit of the regression line and preliminarily con-
firms the positive association between income and economic inequalities.  
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1 - Odds Ratios (OR) for voting 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Odds Ratios (OR) for working in organizations 
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Figure 3 - Odds Ratios (OR) for signing a petition 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Odds Ratios (OR) for boycotting certain products 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Income Inequality and Participation at the Individual Level 
Needless to say, the analysis in the previous section is still preliminary. On the one 
hand, the association between economic and political inequality is not controlled for a 
number of variables - at level-1 and level-2 - that might make the relationship spurious. 
On the other hand, the analysis is at the aggregate level and is not informative on the 
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macro-micro impact of economic inequality on individual propensity to engage politi-
cally. This is instead necessary, in order to assess a direct link between the effect of 
macro-economic predictors and micro-level behaviors. As explained in more details in 
section 3.4, Multilevel Models are necessary to test correctly the impact of variables at 
different levels of analysis.  
Table 2 below displays the coefficients of the Multilevel analysis. Two different 
models for each form of participation are reported: the first one addresses the re-
search question on the direct effect of inequality on participation, the second one in-
cludes the interaction terms between Gini and income, and is thus related to the sec-
ond research inquiry, i.e. the effect of inequality contingent on individual income6.  
As a general rule, expectations about control variables included in the model are 
confirmed. First and foremost, the dummy associated with the post-communist legacy 
always displays a strongly negative effect on any form of participation, which confirms 
the gap in political engagement between Eastern and Western European countries 
highlighted by previous studies (Howard 2003; Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Pacek et al. 
2009). In more detail, living in a post-communist country decreases the predicted 
probability to vote (-12.49%), to work in organizations (-11.64%), to sign petitions (-
14.21%) and to boycott products (-10.57%). All predicted probabilities are reported in 
table 3 below. In a Binomial Multilevel Model, the coefficient β associated with each Xn 
is the effect of a unit increment of X on the logit scale and the probability is thus com-
puted by assigning different scores for the variable under scrutiny, holding all other 
variables constant at their mean value and dummy variables at 1 (Afshartous and de 
Leeuw 2005; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009). Needless to say, the percentages do 
not correspond to observed percentages, since they are computed probabilities with all 
other variables held constant at their mean value7.  
For the other control at the country-level, the selected measure of electoral dispro-
portionality indeed shows a statistically significant and negative effect on voting, which 
accounts for approximately 10 percentage points less in the probability to be active. At 
 
6
 Even if not reported, an empty model (or random intercept-only model) was estimated, in order to see 
whether significant variance exists between countries. The test showed that statistically significant differ-
ences exist and that a percentage of 9% (voting), 19% (petitioning), 23% (boycotting products), and 28% 
(working in organizations) of the total variance in the level of participation is accounted for by differences 
between countries (on this, see Hayes 2006, 393-394). These percentages are roughly halved by the intro-
duction of the independent variables, as reported in the VPC row. 
7
 If any, the computed probabilities confirm the fairly good fit of the statistical models: as an example, the 
observed  percentages of voters in Western and Eastern European countries is 80.3% and 68.9% respec-
tively. The figures come close to the 82.23% and 69.74% computed on the basis of the coefficients report-
ed in Table 2.  
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the same time, it apparently does not make any difference for all other behaviors, even 
though it is interesting to note that disproportionality is negatively associated with a 
conventional behavior such as working in organizations, and positively associated with 
unconventional behaviors such as petitioning and boycotting.  
Among controls at the individual level, the two dummies on trade union member-
ship and on the place of birth display a constant and opposite influence. On the one 
hand, citizens born in another country display systematically lower interest in political 
engagement: the participatory gap is particularly strong in the case of voting (-21.86%), 
for which restrictive citizenship rules probably make the difference, but it is significant 
also for all other forms of participation. On the other hand, members of the trade un-
ion are unsurprisingly more active, with approximately 5 percentage points more on 
average in their predicted probabilities to participate. More interestingly, the effect of 
other control variables is not equally constant. Age, for instance, is negatively associat-
ed with voting and working in association (e.g. a 65-year old is 30 percentage points 
more likely to have voted in the last election as compared to a 25-year old), but it is 
positively associated to both petitioning and boycotting products. This is coherent with 
Melo and Stockemer's findings (2014) on the age effect regarding protest behaviors.  
In a similar manner, females do not necessarily participate less: even though they 
have lower probability to vote and work in organizations, they are more active both in 
the case of petitioning and boycotting. Conversely, religious people are generally more 
active, but not in the case of petitioning and, even more, boycotting.  
Last but not least, education is the single, strongest predictor of political activism. 
Having a 10-year educational history (the common compulsory education in countries 
such as France, Germany, Spain, and Italy) or a 20-year one accounts for a large differ-
ence in citizen probability to vote (17.27%), to work in organizations (14.67%), to sign 
petitions (20.33%), and to boycott products (17.03%).  
Coming to the main variables of interest, the data show that economic resources at 
the individual level do make a difference (coherently with H1), even though its effect is 
smaller than other indicators of socio-economic status (such as education). Most sur-
prisingly, the income effect is stronger for voting than for other forms of participation, 
but this is mainly due to the fact that the predicted probabilities are computed at dif-
ferent points along the logistic curve. At the country-level, income inequality never in-
creases the level of participation: quite the opposite, the predicted probabilities to be 
active invariably drop, when comparing an individual living in the most equal and 
someone living in the most unequal country: voting (-11.04%), working in 
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Table 2 - Multilevel binomial regression models  
 Vote Work organiz. Sign petition Boycott products 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
         
Income .101
*** 
(.006) 
.310
*** 
(.048) 
.065
*** 
(.006) 
-.129
* 
(.056) 
.039
*** 
(.005) 
-.183
*** 
(.044) 
.047
*** 
(.006) 
-.190
*** 
(.051) 
Gini -.053
* 
(.026) 
-.019 
(.027) 
-.118
*** 
(.032) 
-.158
*** 
(.033) 
-.071
* 
(.036) 
-.115
*** 
(.036) 
-.102
*** 
(.040) 
-.150
*** 
(.042) 
Gini*income  -.007
*** 
(.002) 
 .007
** 
(.002) 
 .008
*** 
(.002) 
 .009
*** 
(.002) 
Individual controls        
Years of educ. .106
*** 
(.005) 
.107
*** 
(.005) 
.090
*** 
(.004) 
.089
*** 
(.004) 
.098
*** 
(.004) 
.097
*** 
(.004) 
.106
*** 
(.004) 
.105
*** 
(.004) 
Age .032
*** 
(.001) 
.032
*** 
(.001) 
.007
*** 
(.001) 
.007
*** 
(.001) 
-.009
*** 
(.001) 
-.009
*** 
(.001) 
.002
* 
(.001) 
.002
* 
(.001) 
Religiosity .043
*** 
(.005) 
.043
*** 
(.005) 
.072
*** 
(.006) 
.072
*** 
(.006) 
.005 
(.005) 
.005 
(.005) 
-.014
* 
(.005) 
-.014
* 
(.005) 
Gender (female) -.060
* 
(.030) 
-.060
* 
(.030) 
-.321
*** 
(.033) 
-.322
*** 
(.033) 
.173
*** 
(.028) 
.172
*** 
(.028) 
.174
*** 
(.031) 
.173
*** 
(.031) 
Born in another 
country 
-1.111
*** 
(.053) 
-1.111
*** 
(.053) 
-.464
*** 
(.061) 
-.462
*** 
(.061) 
-.495
*** 
(.052) 
-.494
*** 
(.052) 
-.255
*** 
(.056) 
-.253
*** 
(.056) 
Member trade 
union 
.241
*** 
(.035) 
.240
*** 
(.035) 
.327
*** 
(.037) 
.326
*** 
(.037) 
.399
*** 
(.033) 
.398
*** 
(.033) 
.271
*** 
(.036) 
.269
*** 
(.036) 
Country controls        
Index of dispropor. -.298
* 
(.151) 
-.303
* 
(.151) 
-.156 
(.184) 
-.158 
(.184) 
.225 
(.209) 
.225 
(.209) 
.125 
(.236) 
.125 
(.236) 
Post-communism -.697
*** 
(.199) 
-.691
*** 
(.199) 
-1.721
*** 
(.246) 
-1.737
*** 
(.246) 
-1.365
*** 
(.277) 
-1.382
*** 
(.274) 
-1.502
*** 
(.312) 
-1.521
*** 
(.312) 
         
Intercept -.168 
(.735) 
-1.166 
(.769) 
-.164 
(.898) 
.938 
(.944) 
-.479 
(1.012) 
.756 
(1.031) 
-.460 
(1.143) 
.888 
(1.174) 
Level 2 residual var. .172
** 
(.058) 
.171
** 
(.058) 
.252
** 
(.088) 
.247
** 
(.086) 
.334
** 
(.112) 
.327
** 
(.110) 
.423
** 
(.142) 
.419
** 
(.141) 
VPC .050 .049 .071 .069 .092 .090 .114 .112 
         
N level-1 47,515 47,515 47,515 47,515 47,515 47,515 47,515 47,515 
N level-2 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
AIC 154104.
2 
154330.6 179102.2 179609.6 163494.3 163791.5 172860.3 173285.5 
* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.005 
 
organizations (-22.93%), signing petitions (-17.09%), and boycotting products (-
19.09%). This is at odds with the expectations derived from the conflict theory pre-
sented above. Political participation is never nourished by larger economic inequalities, 
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neither if one considers classic electoral participation (H2a), nor for what pertains to al-
ternative forms of engagement (H2c). Rather, it significantly diminishes the level of par-
ticipation in all four types (H2b).  
 
Table 3 - Predicted probabilities 
 Voting Work organization Sign 
petition 
Boycott products 
 Min** Max** Min** Max** Min** Max** Min** Max** 
Level-1 variables        
Income 75.45 88.41 11.62 19.10 17.88 23.63 11.95 17.16 
Education 73.60 90.87 10.01 24.68 13.77 34.10 9.00 26.09 
Religiosity 79.79 85.32 11.59 20.04 20.02
*
 20.75
*
 14.74 13.22 
Age*** 68.20 88.52 12.40 16.06 24.54 18.09 13.46 14.50 
Born in an-
other coun-
try 
82.23 60.37 14.61 9.71 20.32 13.45 14.10 11.29 
Gender 82.23 81.34 14.61 11.04 20.32 23.27 14.10 16.35 
Member of 
union 
82.23 85.48 14.61 19.17 20.32 27.54 14.10 17.72 
Level-2 variables        
Absolute 
disproport. 
86.03 75.47 16.58
*
 12.14
*
 17.05
*
 25.77
*
 12.71
*
 16.31
*
 
Post-
communist 
82.23 69.74 14.61 2.97 20.32 6.11 14.10 3.53 
Gini coeff. 87.52 76.48 30.17 7.24 30.81 13.72 26.78 7.69 
* Statistically non significant effects.  
** The minimum and the maximum correspond to the smallest and biggest value in any scale (e.g. 1 and 
10 respectively in the income scale). As for dummy variables, maximum is always 1 (e.g. females).  
*** For the sake of the argument, the minimum and the maximum are 25 and 65 years respectively. 
 
In regards to the second research inquiry mentioned in the introduction, one should 
be interested in evaluating whether the Gini coefficient has an effect that is contingent 
on income. Such inquiry is typically addressed with cross-level interactions (Anderson 
2007; Aguinis and Culpepper 2015): an interaction term between Gini and income is 
thus included in model 2. If expectations based on the conflict theory and on studies on 
the effects of relative deprivation on political engagement are correct, one should ex-
pect the interaction term to counteract the impact of income on political participation.  
The data provide contradictory results in this respect. On the one hand, the interac-
tion term suggests that the participatory gap determined by income is diminished by 
higher levels of inequality in the case of voting: all other things being equal, the differ-
ence in electoral participation is diminished by higher inequality. On the other, the op-
posite trend is highlighted in the case of all other forms of participation, i.e. a larger 
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gap in most unequal countries. Moreover, the interaction effects need to be tested, 
because their interpretation is symmetrical in nature (Aguinis et al. 2013). In other 
words, it is necessary to make sure that the decreased or increased gap determined by 
income is directly linked to a different macro-micro impact by income inequality on in-
dividuals8. To this end, I replicate the analysis with all control variables in the dataset, 
split in income quintiles. 
 
Table 4 - Effects of inequality on political participation by income quintile 
 
 Poorest quin-
tile 
Second quintile Median quin-
tile 
Fourth quintile Richest quin-
tile 
Vote -.033
 
(.029) 
-.057
 
(.030) 
-.065
* 
(.029) 
-.053
 
(.028) 
-.069
* 
(.032) 
Work organiza-
tion 
-.134
*** 
(.033) 
-.152
*** 
(.037) 
-.130
*** 
(.031) 
-.114
** 
(.035) 
-.055
 
(.037) 
Sign petition -.067
* 
(.034) 
-.103
* 
(.041) 
-.073
* 
(.037) 
-.059
 
(.041) 
-.020
 
(.033) 
Boycott -.096
* 
(.044) 
-.163
*** 
(.041) 
.-.086
* 
(.040) 
-.060
 
(.042) 
-.059
 
(.049) 
* p< 0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.005 
 
The first row describes the effect of income inequality for voting: coherently with its 
main effect reported in model 1 (Table 2), the impact is barely significant across the 
whole population. However, its influence is sizeable only for the richest and the medi-
um income earners, hence the diminished participatory gap between better- and 
worse-off in most unequal countries. The other rows tell quite a different story: income 
inequality never shows a statistically significant effect on the richest and, set aside the 
case of working in organizations, on the second richest quintiles. Its negative impact is 
significant only for medium income earners and the poorest group in the population 
and it is thus accountable for the increased participatory gap between well-to-do and 
others in most unequal countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
8
 Even though the alternative interpretation – that the effect of income is different across levels of income 
inequality - is in principle the other side of the same coin, other unobserved variables may intervene and 
make the interaction spurious. The same confirmatory analysis is thus employed in similar studies (e.g. Solt 
2008). 
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5. Conclusion  
 
Inequality has recently attracted a great deal of attention with respect to its effect 
on democratic stability (Houle 2009, Jung and Sunde 2014). Its ramifications should be 
carefully evaluated, first and foremost with regards to the democratic ideal of political 
equality. Following Dubrow (2014), this article contributes to highlight the link between 
economic and political inequalities - at least for what concerns citizen participation. A 
small digression in this respect is needed. As a matter of fact, simply acknowledging 
that some participate and some others do not, may be interpreted as irrelevant, as 
long as no legal obstacle prevents individuals to be politically active. As it is well-
known, the mainstream definition of democracy is dependent on the power to decide 
in the course of a competitive process (Schumpeter 1942; Sartori 1987). From this 
point of view, unequal participation is not problematic per se, even more so as liberal 
democracy recognizes (and upholds) both the right to participate and the right not to 
do so. Demonstrating that some citizens abstain from voting is thus no major problem, 
as long as it is assumed to be depending on an individual’s free choice.   
The issue is complex and addressing it exhaustively is well beyond the scope of this 
article. However, a preliminary response may be sketched: first of all, democracy is 
both a descriptive and a prescriptive term (Morlino 2011, 34). As such, it cannot re-
solve, once and for all, the inescapable tension between its pragmatic and its redemp-
tive face (Blokker 2010, 19-20; Canovan 1999, 9-14; Oakeshott 1996) - i.e. its  norma-
tive ideals such as the equal representation of citizen interests (Dahl 1971). In addition 
to this, the very basic notion of free choice is questionable. Abstention from voting 
might not be a problem, as long as it is evenly spread across a population. If not - that 
is if individual predictors of socio-economic conditions significantly correlate with the 
choice to abstain - participation is not freely chosen, "or it is freely chosen in a different 
sense, as the conditions that are statistically correlated with this choice [of non-
participation] are themselves not freely chosen but consist of circumstances that are 
given" (Offe 2013, 203).  
Bearing this in mind, the article elaborates first a measure of political inequality. Un-
surprisingly, the analysis confirms the recurrent gap between high- and low-income 
earners. More interestingly, the data show also that such gap is positively associated 
with the selected macro-economic indicators of income inequality, thus suggesting a 
link between the two dimensions.  
The second part of the empirical analysis goes more in depth, and seeks to establish 
a connection between the participatory gap and the macro-micro impact of economic 
inequality. It is thus shown that inequality always depresses political participation - 
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contrary to expectations rooted in the conflict theory - and almost always contributes 
to enlarge the participatory gap between the rich and the poor. In particular, it shows 
its detrimental role in connection to alternative forms of participation, which is any-
thing but negligible, given those studies showing that alternative forms of engagement 
are even more influential than conventional ones (APSA Task Force on Inequality and 
American Democracy 2004).  
All in all: Solt's findings are by and large confirmed, even if tested in times of eco-
nomic turmoil. Nevertheless, an important distinction is introduced, as the discrimina-
tory impact of income inequality holds true for all alternative forms of engagement, 
but not for voting. Further studies can easily follow to explain this. Does it depend on 
the economic crisis itself, which might have promoted electoral participation among 
the worse-off under conditions of higher inequality? Or does it depend on the peculiar 
nature of electoral participation, which is typically influenced by moral beliefs, or by 
expressive concerns, rather than by economic motivations (Brennan and Hamlin, 2000; 
Baron 2003)?  
The analysis suggests that alternative forms of participation, i.e. those that are more 
expensive in terms of money, time, and intellectual commitment. are more exposed to 
the macro-micro discriminatory effect of contextual variables such as inequality. In this 
respect, the article builds on Schäfer's warning against the higher discriminatory nature 
of alternative forms of engagement as compared to traditional voting (Schäfer 2012; 
Schäfer and Schoen 2013). Rather than fostering a conflictual engagement in politics, 
economic inequality is thus found to alienate the poorest part of the population, thus 
magnifying the discriminatory impact of economic resources at the individual level. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(1) 2016: 72-100, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p72 
 
93 
 
Appendix A - Participation in rich and poor quintiles and Odds Ratios (OR) 
  Voting 
Working in  
organizations 
Signing petitions 
Boycotting  
products 
  %  OR %  OR %  OR %  OR 
Belgium 
Poor 86,1 
0,539 
14,8 
0,572 
15,4 
0,495 
11,1 
0,843 
Rich 92 23,3 26,9 12,9 
Bulgaria 
Poor 76,2 
1,196 
0,5 
0,196 
4,7 
0,327 
1,6 
0,255 
Rich 72,8 2,5 13,1 6 
Switzerland 
Poor 59,6 
0,481 
14,2 
0,554 
29,1 
0,555 
26,5 
0,670 
Rich 75,4 23 42,5 35 
Cyprus 
Poor 78,6 
0,721 
5,4 
0,337 
8,3 
0,321 
9 
0,583 
Rich 83,6 14,5 22 14,5 
Czech 
Poor 57,1 
0,531 
5,4 
0,927 
16,5 
0,580 
10,1 
0,594 
Rich 71,5 5,8 25,4 15,9 
Germany 
Poor 73,7 
0,298 
25 
0,500 
30,3 
0,605 
27 
0,441 
Rich 90,4 40 41,8 45,6 
Denmark 
Poor 92,6 
0,494 
22,1 
0,617 
24,4 
0,847 
26,2 
0,891 
Rich 96,2 31,5 27,6 28,5 
Estonia 
Poor 62,9 
0,571 
3,4 
0,461 
5,9 
0,373 
3,7 
0,350 
Rich 74,8 7,1 14,4 9,9 
Spain 
Poor 73,2 
0,563 
21,4 
0,635 
30,3 
0,519 
16,2 
0,693 
Rich 82,9 30 45,6 21,8 
Finland 
Poor 80,9 
0,492 
29,5 
0,530 
20,4 
0,637 
31 
0,688 
Rich 89,6 44,1 28,7 39,5 
France 
Poor 75,3 
0,525 
9,5 
0,456 
25,3 
0,572 
27,3 
0,600 
Rich 85,3 18,7 37,2 38,5 
UK 
Poor 63,4 
0,422 
5,6 
0,506 
26,2 
0,441 
13,9 
0,430 
Rich 80,4 10,5 44,6 27,3 
Hungary 
Poor 68,4 
0,632 
3,3 
0,798 
1,8 
0,429 
3,2 
0,547 
Rich 77,4 4,1 4,1 5,7 
Ireland 
Poor 70,8 
0,465 
10,4 
0,571 
22,3 
0,679 
10,2 
0,664 
Rich 83,9 16,9 29,7 14,6 
Israel 
Poor 71 
0,296 
2,5 
0,449 
6,7 
0,230 
18,8 
0,523 
Rich 89,2 5,4 23,8 30,7 
Iceland 
Poor 90,8 
1,936 
37,7 
0,605 
57,2 
0,816 
30 
0,566 
Rich 83,6 50 62,1 43,1 
Italy 
Poor 78,4 
0,299 
12,2 
0,438 
18,4 
0,324 
7,6 
0,263 
Rich 92,4 24,1 41 23,8 
Lithuania 
Poor 54,7 
1,012 
1,9 
0,605 
6,9 
1,066 
2,2 
1,584 
Rich 54,4 3,1 6,5 1,4 
Netherlands 
Poor 76,8 
0,384 
19,8 
0,508 
18,8 
0,666 
13,9 
1,052 
Rich 89,6 32,7 25,8 13,3 
Norway 
Poor 83,6 
0,516 
28,7 
0,728 
33,3 
0,787 
21 
0,697 
Rich 90,8 35,6 38,8 27,6 
Poland 
Poor 62,4 
0,436 
5,5 
0,476 
7,9 
0,514 
3,2 
0,370 
Rich 79,2 10,9 14,3 8,2 
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Portugal 
Poor 64,1 
0,419 
2,9 
0,179 
4,1 
0,196 
0,9 
0,067 
Rich 81 14,3 17,9 11,9 
Sweden 
Poor 85,6 
0,326 
30,6 
0,695 
39,6 
0,710 
39,5 
0,699 
Rich 94,8 38,8 48 48,3 
Slovenia 
Poor 70,4 
0,595 
1,8 
0,687 
5,3 
0,344 
3,7 
0,687 
Rich 80 2,6 14 5,3 
Slovakia 
Poor 75,9 
0,842 
5,4 
1,574 
17,1 
0,897 
13,2 
1,658 
Rich 78,9 3,5 18,7 8,4 
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